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SECOND GUESSING DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE STARE




In Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
170-year-old dual-sovereignty doctrine. That doctrine permits both
the federal and state governments—as “separate sovereigns”—to each
prosecute a defendant for the same offense. Justice Thomas con-
curred with the majority opinion in Gamble, but wrote separately to
reject the traditional stare decisis formulation. In particular, the
factors the majority used to evaluate stare decisis, in his view,
amount to nothing more than marbles placed subjectively on either
side of the stare decisis balancing scale. He would have preferred,
instead, an inquiry into whether the precedent was demonstrably
erroneous as an original matter, and he dismissed the stare decisis
factors as irrelevant to that question. Justice Thomas may be right
to criticize the subjectiveness of a multifactor balancing approach to
stare decisis. Yet even if doubt about the factors is warranted, this
Comment contends that certain factors may still be relevant to
Justice Thomas’s inquiry into precedent’s correctness as an original
matter. In making this case, the Comment divides the stare decisis
factors into three groups: a priori factors—those factors that analyze
a precedent for its original correctness—a posteriori factors—which
explore the effects of precedent’s real-world application, and hybrid
factors—which may be employed in either an a priori or a posteriori
* University of Virginia School of Law, J.D. 2020. I would like to thank Christian Talley
for helpful comments, conversations, and suggestions. Thanks also to the members of the
William & Mary Law Review, especially Emily O’Hara, Christine D’Alessandro, and Emily
Snyder, for their careful editing and helpful feedback. I am solely responsible for all errors.
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manner. When factors are used in an a priori fashion, this Comment
contends that they remain useful as proxies to show whether
precedent was right or wrong as an original matter. On that basis,
some of the factors may help jurists decide whether precedent falls
within “the realm of permissible interpretation,” or, in the alterna-
tive, whether the precedent is “demonstrably erroneous.” It follows,
therefore, that even under Justice Thomas’s stare decisis approach,
in which all “demonstrably erroneous precedent” would be corrected
“regardless of whether other factors support overruling the prece-
dent,” certain factors remain material to his ultimate question—
whether the past precedent is within “the realm of permissible
interpretation.”
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court considers whether to overrule a
precedent, the question the Court asks is “whether stare decisis
counsels in favor of adhering to the decision.”1 Stare decisis, Latin
for “let the decision stand,”2 is a doctrine with ancient roots.3 It was
also a principle that readily spread to the judiciary of the new
American republic. In the years shortly following the Constitution’s
ratification, the Court grappled with whether it should freely
overrule precedents, ultimately deciding to embrace the doctrine of
stare decisis.4
Now, as then, stare decisis represents the “idea that today’s Court
should stand by yesterday’s decisions.”5 The doctrine thus encour-
ages “courts to stand by the thing decided and not to disturb the
calm.”6 Despite its status as an ancient maxim, “[s]tare decisis is not
an inexorable command.”7 It is rather a “principle of policy and not
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”8 Precisely
because stare decisis is part policy judgment rather than a mechani-
cal formula, an examination of why the Court might invoke or reject
stare decisis as a rationale for its decision is key to understanding
how the Court approaches the question of whether to overrule
precedent.
1. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019).
2. Sol Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals, 59 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 445, 445 n.2 (1985).
3. See SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45-46
(Charles M. Gray ed., 1971).
4. See Parisis G. Filippatos, Note, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of
Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 337 (1991);
see also NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 52 (2019) (“[T]he founders ...
considered precedent as among the primary tools of the judicial trade.”).
5. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
6. Filippatos, supra note 4, at 335; see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The whole function of the
doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must
nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”).
7. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
8. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
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By custom, the Court employs a number of factors to determine
whether stare decisis applies.9 As with any multifactor test, none of
the factors are dispositive, and different Justices weigh the
importance of each factor in their own way.10 For that reason, any
one of the factors may be invoked in support of the Court’s applica-
tion (or non-application) of stare decisis. In a recent decision, the
Court set forth the following list of factors: “the quality of [the
precedent’s] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its
consistency with other related decisions, developments since the
decision was handed down, and reliance on the decision.”11 Yet that
list is nonexhaustive. From time to time, the Court has added new
factors, including the precedent’s “antiquity” (i.e., how much time
has passed since the precedent was first established),12 the margin
of the precedent’s victory,13 the merit of the prior decision,14 how
many times the precedent has been reaffirmed,15 and the impact of
the precedent on individual liberty.16 Thus, as the law currently
9. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 923 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would consult the list of factors that our case law indicates are
relevant when we consider overruling an earlier case.”).
10. David L. Berland, Stopping the Pendulum: Why Stare Decisis Should Constrain the
Court from Further Modification of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 701.
11. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-
79 (2018).
12. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009); see also South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the antiquity factor is
premised on the notion that “the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than
decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the
surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity”).
13. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1991). In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist
relied upon the fact that the prior cases were decided “by the narrowest of margins, over
spirited dissents” to challenge the basic underpinnings of a decision. Id. at 829.
14. William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 1 UTAH L. REV. 53, 80
(2002).
15. Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105,
135 (2015) (“[R]ecent decisions should be more amenable to reconsideration than are
longstanding and entrenched lines of cases.”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 152 (2010) (“[T]he more recently the earlier case was
decided, the less forcefully the stare decisis anti-overruling principle should be applied.”);
NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 4 (2008) (“Precedent-following
is very obviously a backward-looking activity: when we decide on the basis of precedent, we
treat as significant the fact that essentially the same decision has been made before.”).
16. Berland, supra note 10, at 706.
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stands, the list contains at least eleven factors: (1) the quality of the
precedent’s reasoning, (2) the workability of the precedent, (3) the
precedent’s consistency with other related decisions, (4) develo-
pments since the decision was handed down, (5) reliance on the
decision, (6) the precedent’s original margin of victory, (7) the merit
of the precedent, (8) the age of the precedent, (9) the number of
times the precedent has been reaffirmed, (10) the impact of the
precedent on individual liberty, and (11) substantial and ongoing
criticism of the precedent.17
Though courts often invoke the factors en masse, this Comment
argues that the above list actually consists of three distinct types of
factors—a posteriori, hybrid, and a priori factors. Of the eleven
factors, four can be categorized as purely a posteriori—meaning that
the weight of those factors turns on the effects of the precedent’s
application in the real world.18 The a posteriori factors look to the
results of the precedent when actually applied.19 This category
includes (1) the workability of precedent, (2) developments since the
decision was handed down, (3) reliance on the decision, and (4) the
impact of the precedent on individual liberty. By contrast, two
factors can be classified as purely a priori—meaning that they an-
alyze precedent for its original, intrinsic legal reasoning, rather
than its real-world application.20 The a priori factors scrutinize the
precedent itself, regardless of the precedent’s applicable effects.21
The (1) quality of the precedent’s reasoning and (2) the merit of the
precedent fall into the a priori category. Finally, the remaining five
factors are hybrids. These five factors are inherently neither a priori
nor a posteriori, but may be categorized as one or the other de-
pending on how a particular Justice decides to use them. If the
factor is employed to analyze precedent with regard to its practical
17. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
18. See J. Lyn Entrikin, Global Judicial Transparency Norms: A Peek Behind the Robes
in a Whole New World - A Look at Global “Democratizing” Trends in Judicial Opinion-Issuing
Practices, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 55, 83 (2019).
19. A posteriori means “‘[f]rom afterwards,’ i.e., from the effect to the cause.” Arthur Allen
Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2038 (1985). Therefore, it
is “[a] mode of reasoning in which one looks to results and reasons back to what might have
been their cause.” Id.
20. See Entrikin, supra note 18, at 83.
21. “In logic and law,” a priori is “a term for a mode of thought or reasoning ‘from before’
or ‘from prior principles.’” Leff, supra note 19, at 2048.
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application, it is categorized as an a posteriori factor;22 if used to
examine a precedent’s intrinsic logic without regard to its practical
application, it is classified as an a priori factor.23 This hybrid camp
includes (1) the margin of victory, (2) the age of the precedent,
(3) substantial and ongoing criticism, (4) the number of times the
precedent has been reaffirmed, and (5) the precedent’s consistency
with other related decisions. By and large, these factors instruct the
Court to overturn a decision only if the precedent was “a priori
wrongly decided or a posteriori deleterious.”24 The following chart
diagrams the three categories and their corresponding factors.
The A Priori Factors
(1) the quality of the precedent’s
reasoning and (2) the merit of the
precedent.
The Hybrid Factors 
(1) the margin of victory, (2) the age
of the precedent, (3) substantial and
ongoing criticism, (4) the number of
times the precedent has been
reaffirmed, and (5) the precedent’s
consistency with other related
decisions.
The A Posteriori Factors
(1) the workability of the precedent,
(2) developments since the decision
was handed down, (3) reliance on the
decision, and (4) the impact of the
precedent on individual liberty. 
The continuing relevance and application of these factors was
placed into sharp relief when, this past term in Gamble v. United
States, the Court confronted the question of “whether to overrule a
longstanding interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment” that permits successive federal and state
prosecutions for the same conduct.25 In answering that question,
22. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
24. Filippatos, supra note 4, at 375.
25. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963 (2019); see also Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863,
1870 (2016) (discussing the history of the dual-sovereignty doctrine). The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same
7
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three of the opinions emphasized or downplayed the relevance of
certain factors to advance their respective arguments. Justice
Thomas’s view that his colleagues failed to engage in a uniform
analysis of the stare decisis factors led him to call for the end of the
multifactor approach. In support of his criticism, Justice Thomas
argued that when the Court “decide[s] whether the scales tip in
favor of overruling precedent,” the weight accorded each factor
“ebb[s] and flow[s] with the Court’s desire to achieve a particular
end.”26 Accordingly, he denounced the Court’s use of the factors as
marbles, so to speak, to be placed on the stare decisis balancing
scale in support of what he considered policy-oriented outcomes.27
In place of the balancing approach, Justice Thomas asserted that
the Court should simply ask whether the precedent is “demonstra-
bly erroneous” under “the original meaning of the text.”28 On the
whole, Justice Thomas may be right to question the subjectiveness
of a multifactor balancing approach to stare decisis. If anything, the
weight of the various factors seems to “turn on the fundamentally
competing perspectives of individual justices.”29 But even if Justice
Thomas’s misgivings about the multifactor balancing approach are
warranted, this Comment argues that certain factors remain highly
relevant to Justice Thomas’s guiding inquiry—whether the prece-
dent is correct or incorrect as an original matter.
Instead of simply casting aside all of the factors, this Comment
advances the novel argument that both the a priori and hybrid
factors—when used in the a priori sense—serve as useful proxy tools
to decide whether precedent was rightly or wrongly decided on the
merits.30 In this regard, Justice Thomas prematurely dismissed the
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1989.
29. Glen Staszewski, Precedent and Disagreement, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (2018);
see also William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3517580 [https://
perma.cc/6V6E-Z27Z] (“The Court’s own cases do invoke reasons when they decide whether
prior cases should be overruled. But there are competing sets of reasons, laid down in highly
controversial cases, and they leave plenty of discretion in the hands of the Court, as evidenced
from its recent disagreements.”).
30. To be sure, academics have previously referred to stare decisis as a mere tool. See
Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2046 (1996) (noting that recent formulations of stare decisis
8
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relevance of the factors writ large. To make this argument, the
Comment is divided into five Parts. Part I briefly summarizes the
facts of Gamble v. United States and discusses the ultimate outcome
of the case. Part II contextualizes Justice Thomas’s dismissal of the
a priori and hybrid factors by summarizing his approach to stare
decisis. Part III explores Justice Alito’s use of both the a priori and
hybrid factors as proxies to support the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s
correctness. It also highlights the majority’s use of the a posteriori
factors to show why they have no role under Justice Thomas’s
approach. Part IV reviews the role of the factors as proxies for
original error in Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of the dual-sovereignty
doctrine. Likewise, the a posteriori factors are explored to accentu-
ate their irrelevance to the demonstrably erroneous approach to
stare decisis. Part V describes Justice Ginsburg’s evaluation of the
factors in her argument for the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s wrong-
ness. In conclusion, this Comment contends that Justice Thomas
may be right to second guess the subjectiveness of the multifactor
balancing approach to stare decisis. In the end, however, his label-
ing of the factors as wholly irrelevant overlooks some of the factors’
value as tools to inquire whether precedent is, in his words, “demon-
strably erroneous”—meaning “outside the realm of permissible
interpretation.”31
I. THE FACTS AND THE DECISION THAT CAUSED MR. GAMBLE TO
SEE DOUBLE
In 2008, an Alabama jury convicted Terance Martez Gamble of
second-degree robbery, a felony offense.32 Seven years later, Mr.
Gamble was “pulled ... over for a faulty headlight.”33 The police
conceive the doctrine as a pragmatic “tool to accomplish certain specific goals”); see also Jill
E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 93, 97 (2003) (stating that courts have “a variety of mechanisms” and “tools” under the
traditional stare decisis doctrine to either evade or uphold precedent). Yet there is a
conspicuous absence of scholarship dedicated to exploring the factors as proxies to adjudge
the rightness or wrongness of precedent on the merits.
31. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring); see DUXBURY, supra note 15, at
17 (“Precedents, therefore, are best described not as law but as evidence of how judges have
interpreted the law.”).
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Gamble, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (No. 17-646).
33. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Gamble, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (No. 17-646).
9
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officer, upon approaching Mr. Gamble’s vehicle, smelled marijuana
emanating from the car.34 The officer’s subsequent search of the
vehicle revealed the suspected marijuana along with a 9mm
handgun.35 The state of Alabama prosecuted Mr. Gamble for pos-
sessing marijuana.36 In addition, Mr. Gamble was prosecuted for
violating the state’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute.37 That
law provides that no one convicted of “a crime of violence ... shall
own a firearm or have one in his or her possession.”38 As a result of
the Alabama prosecution, Mr. Gamble was convicted and “received
a one-year sentence.”39
While the state prosecution was pending, the federal government
also prosecuted Mr. Gamble for violating its own felon-in-
possession-of-a-firearm statute.40 Sure enough, the federal charge
was based on “the same incident of November 29, 2015 that gave
rise to his state court conviction.”41 In his motion to dismiss the fed-
eral indictment, Mr. Gamble argued that the federal prosecution
violated his “Fifth Amendment [right] against being placed twice in
jeopardy for the same crime.”42 But, as the district court recognized,
under the long-standing dual-sovereignty doctrine, a state may
prosecute a defendant under state law even if the federal govern-
ment has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal
statute—and vice versa.43 The court, although sympathetic to
“concern[s] over the possible abuses of dual prosecutions,” went on
to state that “until the Supreme Court overturns” the binding




38. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a) (2015); see also § 13A-11-70(2) (defining “crime of violence”
to include robbery). According to Alabama’s Supreme Court, firearm is interpreted to include
a “pistol.” See Ex Parte Taylor, 636 So. 2d 1246, 1246 (Ala. 1993).
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 4.
40. The federal law forbids those convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess
in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9); see also
Kayla Mullen, Gamble v. United States: A Commentary, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
207, 208-09 (2019) (discussing the facts and the criminal standards).
41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 4.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Gamble, No. 16-00090-KD-B, 2016 WL 3460414, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June
21, 2016), aff’d, 2017 WL 3207127 (11th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
10
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precedent, Mr. Gamble’s “double jeopardy claim must fail.”44 Seeing
the writing on the courtroom wall, Mr. Gamble entered into a
conditional guilty plea in the federal proceeding, reserving the right
to challenge the constitutionality of the dual-sovereignty doctrine.45
Unfortunately for Mr. Gamble, his argument that the federal
prosecution violated “his rights pursuant to the Double Jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment” suffered the same fate in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as it did in the district court.46
The Eleventh Circuit dutifully applied binding Supreme Court
precedent and concluded “that prosecution in federal and state court
for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
because the state and federal governments are separate sov-
ereigns.”47 Accordingly, “until the Supreme Court overturns” its
dual-sovereignty doctrine, the federal government could prosecute
“[Mr.] Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prose-
cuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama.”48 Once again, Mr.
Gamble had run into the obstacle of stare decisis.
With nowhere to go but up, Mr. Gamble petitioned the Supreme
Court for review. His petition explicitly called for “[t]he separate-
sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause” to “be over-
ruled.”49 After at least four Justices agreed to review his petition,
Mr. Gamble’s brief directly confronted stare decisis. He argued that
“[s]tare decisis concerns should not keep the Court from overruling
the separate-sovereigns exception.”50 In this respect, the brief con-
tended that Mr. Gamble’s “case exemplifies nearly all of the tra-
ditional justifications for overruling an erroneous precedent.”51 His
brief invoked a number of the stare decisis factors—including at
least one from each of the three categories. For instance, he invoked
an a priori factor by arguing that the dual-sovereignty doctrine “de-
veloped without any thorough consideration of constitutional text
44. Id.
45. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 4.
46. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
47. United States v. Gamble, No. 16-16760, 2017 WL 3207127 (11th Cir. July 28, 2017)
(citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959)), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
48. Id.
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 5.
50. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 7.
51. Id. at 31.
11
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and original meaning.”52 Likewise, he relied upon three a posteriori
factors—that the doctrine is “the product of a bygone era.... It
produces unfair and unworkable results. And it implicates no
reliance interests.”53 Finally, one hybrid factor was mentioned—the
doctrine “was built on a jurisprudential foundation that crumbled
when the Double Jeopardy Clause was incorporated against the
states.”54
At first blush, it may seem ambitious to argue that five factors
from each of the three categories called for overruling the dual-
sovereignty doctrine. Yet Gamble’s attempt to undermine the dual-
sovereignty doctrine with an a priori factor, multiple a posteriori
factors, and a hybrid factor wisely catered to different Justices’
jurisprudential philosophies.55 Indeed, the use of the factors in this
way was likely a prudent decision, as it allows jurists with differing
views of stare decisis to decide whether the precedent should be
reaffirmed or overruled based on either practical or original cor-
rectness considerations. What is more, the brief took the seemingly
ambitious argument a step further—stating that “[f]or any and all
of these reasons, stare decisis should not prevent this Court from
overruling the separate-sovereigns exception.”56 The suggestion that
any one of the factors could tip the stare decisis scale in favor of
scuttling the dual-sovereignty doctrine supports Justice Thomas’s
contention that different Justices will subjectively weigh different
traditional factors to align with their own “desire to achieve a par-
ticular end.”57
On the flip side, the brief focused on multiple factors to demon-
strate that the dual-sovereignty doctrine was wrong as an original
matter. The first factor it analyzed was the quality of the prece-
dent’s reasoning.58 As that factor falls within the a priori category,
it is no surprise that its invocation was tethered to an argument
that the dual-sovereignty doctrine was wrong on the merits from the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 31-32.
54. Id. at 31.
55. See infra Parts II-V.
56. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 32 (emphasis added).
57. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 32.
12
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very beginning.59 The brief also marshaled the hybrid doctrinal
changes factor—that incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
undermined the original doctrinal underpinnings of the dual-
sovereignty doctrine.60 Put differently, incorporation undercut the
original rationale for the dual-sovereignty rule, because the Double
Jeopardy Clause now applied to both state and federal governments.
Use of the hybrid factor in this way placed it on the a priori rather
than the a posteriori side of the divide, as the factor indicated
defects in legal reasoning.
Gamble’s brief went on to cite additional hybrid factors to em-
phasize how erroneous the dual-sovereignty doctrine was from the
outset.61 Those factors included the narrow margin of victory and
the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s substantial and ongoing criticism.62
In this situation, both hybrid factors were used to challenge the
original correctness of the dual-sovereignty doctrine. The margin of
victory factor was utilized to call attention to “ill-considered dicta”
upon which the doctrine was constructed.63 Likewise, the ongoing
criticism factor was invoked to emphasize that the doctrine was
“solidified through a series of decisions that ... ignored prior pre-
cedents, and never meaningfully engaged with the text or original
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”64
Despite Mr. Gamble’s persuasive brief, seven Justices voted to
affirm the dual-sovereignty doctrine.65 In doing so, Justice Alito’s
majority opinion and Justices Ginsburg’s and Gorsuch’s dissents
relied on the stare decisis factors both to assess the precedent’s real-
world effects and to decide whether the precedent was rightly or
wrongly decided as an original matter.66 As a result, this Comment
contends that some of the stare decisis factors may serve a valuable
purpose even under Justice Thomas’s approach. If the a priori and
hybrid factors are used as proxies to show that the precedent was
right or wrong as an original matter, they are relevant to the
59. See id.
60. Id. at 31-32.
61. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 33-35.
63. Id. at 32-33.
64. Id.
65. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963.
66. See id. at 1969, 1993, 2005-06.
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question of whether a decision is “demonstrably erroneous.” To
understand why Justice Thomas dismissed all of the factors in the
first place, however, a thorough understanding of his approach to
stare decisis is a prerequisite.
II. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE AND “DEMONSTRABLY
ERRONEOUS” PRECEDENT
In Gamble, Justice Thomas concurred with the majority but wrote
“separately to address the proper role of the doctrine of stare
decisis.”67 Justice Thomas argued that the “typical formulation” of
stare decisis failed to “comport with [the Court’s] judicial duty un-
der Article III.”68 The judiciary, in his view, is beholden to “the text
of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.”69 Prudential
considerations (represented by the a posteriori factors) thus should
not stand in the way of correcting an erroneous decision. Instead, for
Justice Thomas, the Court must always “adhere[ ] to the correct,
original meaning of the laws.”70 To carry out the judicial duty prop-
erly conceived, Justices must be willing to “‘repudiate[ ]’ constitu-
tional doctrine inconsistent with the Constitution.”71 In other words,
there must be no hesitation to correct a precedent’s reasoning, if, as
an original matter, it is “demonstrably erroneous.”72
In Justice Thomas’s view, a precedent is demonstrably erroneous
when it is “outside the realm of permissible interpretation.”73 Under
67. Id. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. Id.; see also Baude, supra note 29, at 8 (“Justice Thomas argued that judges have an
obligation—not just a power, but a duty—to disregard and overrule any precedent that is
‘demonstrably erroneous.’”).
69. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921,
1929 n.35 (2017).
72. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring); see DUXBURY, supra note 15, at
27-28 (“[C]ourts ought to be able to overrule precedents, their own precedents included, in
order to correct earlierprecedents which misrepresent the range of legitimate judicial
discretion on particular points of law.”); see also Baude, supra note 29, at 9 (summarizing
Justice Thomas’s approach by stating: “[T]o the extent that a precedent reaches the
demonstrably wrong answer about a statute or constitutional provision, it is contrary to the
law, and judges should follow the law rather than the precedent”).
73. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 N.W. U. L. REV. 803, 843
(2009) (“When the original meaning is uncertain, there is a far stronger argument for
14
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Justice Thomas’s approach, then, the “traditional tools of legal
interpretation” (such as the canons of construction) are used to
determine whether an earlier decision is within the realm of
permissibility.74 As long as the prior decision is “within that range
of permissible interpretations,” then the “precedent is relevant”
because “reasonable people” can “arrive at different conclusions.”75
Put another way, “when a court says that a past decision is de-
monstrably erroneous, it is saying not only that it would have
reached a different decision as an original matter, but also that the
prior court went beyond the range of indeterminacy created by the
relevant source of law.”76 Justice Thomas thus endorsed a simple
rule: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent ... [w]e
should not follow it.”77 With his view of the proper formulation of
stare decisis on the table, Justice Thomas next explained the pitfalls
inherent to the multifactor balancing approach to stare decisis.
At the outset, Justice Thomas argued that the factorial approach
to stare decisis is a “principle of policy.”78 The weight accorded to the
factors “ebb[s] and flow[s] with the Court’s desire to achieve a
particular end.”79 Justice Thomas would do away with all “demon-
strably erroneous” precedent, “regardless of whether other factors
support overruling the precedent.”80 Adherence to “demonstrably
erroneous decisions” simply because more factors weigh on one side
of the stare decisis scale, in his view, cloaks “incorrect precedents”
in a “veneer of respectability.”81 Indeed, Justice Thomas’s foremost
following precedent-provided that it is within the range of uncertainty regarding the original
meaning.”).
74. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1986 (citing Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Pre-
cedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001)). It is worth mentioning that originalism is in no way
incompatible with precedent. In fact, originalism “places a premium on precedent,” especially
when there is historical doubt about whether overruling the precedent would deviate from
“historically-settled meaning.” Barrett, supra note 71, at 1923.
76. Caleb Nelson, supra note 75, at 8.
77. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Baude, supra note 29,
at 2 (criticizing Justice Thomas’s approach because his proposal “is neither a regime of
adherence to precedent, nor a regime without precedent, but rather a regime in which
individual Justices have substantial discretion whether to adhere to precedent or not”).
78. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1984.
81. Id. at 1981.
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critique of the factorial approach is that it privileges precedent over
the original meaning of the text. For Justice Thomas, then, the
Court should always correct demonstrably erroneous precedent
regardless of what the factors suggest.82 The duty to correct demon-
strably erroneous decisions flows “directly from the Constitution’s
supremacy over other sources of law.”83 In this respect, Justice
Thomas claimed that under his stare decisis formulation, no factor
is ever required to depart from demonstrably erroneous precedent.84
Instead, “upholding the law’s original meaning is reason enough to
correct course.”85
When expounding his theory of stare decisis, Justice Thomas did
not explain why, exactly, certain factors that explore the original
correctness of the precedent could not serve as useful proxy tools. As
this Comment contends, there is no apparent reason why both the
a priori and hybrid factors cannot be used as proxy tools to channel
whether precedent is, in his words, “demonstrably erroneous.”86 In
fact, a close analysis of the three other opinions in Gamble shows
that Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Ginsburg used some of the factors
as proxy tools for original correctness rather than as prudential
marbles to be placed on the stare decisis balancing scale. This
analysis will also demonstrate why—according to Justice Thomas’s
approach—the a posteriori factors are irrelevant to the question of
whether to overrule demonstrably erroneous precedent. This Com-
ment thus turns to Justice Alito’s use of the a priori and hybrid
factors as proxy tools for the correctness of the dual-sovereignty
doctrine on the merits. It also will touch on Justice Alito’s use of the
82. See id.
83. Id. at 1984.
84. See id. at 1981-84. To be clear, just because Justice Thomas claims that the factors are
irrelevant, does not mean that stare decisis more generally is meaningless under his
approach. Of course, stare decisis would be pointless “if courts were free to overrule a past
decision simply because they would have reached a different decision as an original matter.”
Nelson, supra note 75, at 8; see also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809, 817 (6th Cir.
2015) (Sutton, J.) (“A critical feature of stare decisis—perhaps the salient feature of it—is that
it requires courts to preserve error.”); DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 23 (“[I]f precedents had
absolutely no capacity to constrain, there would be no point to the doctrine of stare decisis.”);
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 73, at 829 (“[P]recedent is authorized by the original
meaning of the Constitution.”).
85. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1986 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1981.
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a posteriori factors to emphasize their irrelevance to Thomas’s approach.
III. THE MAJORITY’S USE OF THE FACTORS AS PROXIES FOR
ORIGINAL CORRECTNESS
Justice Alito’s majority opinion recognized right away that the
case was not simply one about criminal procedure, but that it also
implicated stare decisis. In the first sentence of his opinion, he
framed Gamble as concerning “whether to overrule a longstanding
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.”87 After surveying the text and history of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the majority concluded that “a crime against two sovereigns
constitutes two offenses because each sovereign has an interest to
vindicate.”88 On this analysis, the majority was probably convinced
that the doctrine was correct as an original matter. Later in the
opinion, however, Justice Alito returned to the issue of stare decisis,
arguing that it presented yet “another obstacle” in the way of
overturning the dual-sovereignty doctrine.89
Justice Alito began his stare decisis analysis by positing that ad-
herence to precedent “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on ju-
dicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.”90 This statement, of course, rein-
forces Justice Thomas’s criticism of the factors as mere prudential
marbles used to justify policy-oriented results. In the next sentence
of the opinion, however, Justice Alito refocused his analysis on the
merits of the dual-sovereignty doctrine—stating that “[o]f course, it
is also important to be right.”91 The majority then invoked several
a priori and hybrid factors in support of the dual-sovereignty
doctrine’s original correctness.
First among these hybrid factors was the “antiquity” of the pre-
cedent.92 In this situation, this hybrid factor should be categorized
as a priori, given that the majority used continued adherence to a
87. Id. at 1963 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 1967.
89. Id. at 1969.
90. Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009)).
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dated precedent as evidence of the decision’s original correctness.93
The majority assumed that an erroneous decision would have been
corrected at some point during the precedent’s protracted exis-
tence.94 In other words, jurists year after year would not have con-
tinued to both apply and rely upon foolhardy precedent if it were
demonstrably erroneous as an original matter. Justice Alito adopted
that understanding of the hybrid factor as he contended that the
strength of precedent grows stronger with age.95
The majority also referred to how many times the dual-sover-
eignty doctrine had been reaffirmed.96 Reaffirmation is a hybrid
factor, as it can be used to highlight either prudential or merit-
based considerations. In Gamble, the majority used the factor to
support the original correctness of the precedent.97 In Justice Alito’s
words, any argument that a precedent is erroneous must be “better
than middling” to provide “enough force to break a chain of prece-
dent linking dozens of cases over 170 years.”98 Applying that ratio-
nale, the majority determined that contrary evidence did not “come
close to settling the historical question with enough force to meet
Gamble’s particular burden under stare decisis.”99 The Court’s use
of these hybrid factors to inspect precedent’s original correctness is
unsurprising. A uniform series of decisions is “particularly strong
evidence of the correctness of a particular rule precisely because the
judges in the series would have overruled decisions that they
deemed demonstrably erroneous.”100 The precedent’s continued re-
affirmation, then, served as a proxy for whether that precedent was
correctly decided on the merits and not merely to show that the
precedent had grown unworkable in the present day.
The Court next considered the “developments since the decision
was handed down” factor. This hybrid factor may be used either to






98. Id.; see also Mullen, supra note 40, at 209-13 (surveying the precedential history
behind the current dual-sovereignty doctrine).
99. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1974.
100. Nelson, supra note 75, at 36.
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precedent’s real-world effects in light of surrounding doctrinal
change. Gamble’s brief had used this factor in the a priori sense,
arguing that incorporation of the Fifth Amendment to the states101
“washed away any theoretical foundation for the dual-sovereignty
rule.”102 The majority responded to this argument, however, by
pointing out that “the premises of the dual-sovereignty doctrine
have survived incorporation intact.”103 In the majority’s view, “there
is no logical reason” to depart from an originally correct doctrine
that has withstood the test of doctrinal change.104 In short, Gamble’s
“incorporation-changes-everything argument trades on a false
analogy.”105
When the majority finally turned to Gamble’s a posteriori
factorial arguments, it swept them aside as being outranked by the
dual-sovereignty doctrine’s a priori correctness. For instance, Mr.
Gamble argued that the “far-reaching systemic and structural
changes”106 resulting from the “proliferation of federal criminal
law”107 should strip the dual-sovereignty doctrine of its stare decisis
protection.108 Though the changed circumstances argument was nat-
urally a posteriori—as the described changes in federal law came
decades after the Court first recognized the doctrine—the majority
rejected the argument’s force.109 The “argument obviously assume[d]
that the dual-sovereignty doctrine was legal error from the start,”110
making any a posteriori considerations “only as strong as Gamble’s
argument about the original understanding of double jeopardy
rights”—“an argument that [the Court] ... found wanting.”111 Justice
Alito’s summary dismissal of Gamble’s a posteriori argument
exhibits his preference for a priori considerations of correctness. But
even if the majority had considered the practical effects engendered
101. In Benton v. Maryland, the Supreme Court incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause
to the states. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).




106. Id. at 1980 (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018)).
107. Id. at 1979.
108. Id. at 1979-80.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 1980.
111. Id.
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by changed circumstances, this sort of a posteriori inquiry is
untethered from correctness as an original matter, and thus is not
the sort of factor relevant to Justice Thomas’s analysis of stare
decisis.
 In sum, the majority opinion invoked some of the factors to
evaluate the original correctness of the dual-sovereignty doctrine.
Surprisingly, however, the majority did not entertain many of the
a posteriori factors—including reliance, workability, margin of
victory, or impact on individual liberty. If the factors were truly
mere marbles to be placed on the prudential scale, one might have
expected all the applicable factors from each of the three categories
to play a role in the equation. But as Justice Alito himself stated,
what matters most is whether the dual-sovereignty doctrine was
correct—according to its “original understanding.”112 In his view,
then, it appears the a priori factors sit atop the factorial hierarchy,
along with the hybrid factors when used to explore the original
correctness of a precedent. The majority’s treatment of the factors
as proxy tools for original correctness rather than balancing marbles
thus calls into question Justice Thomas’s dismissal of their rele-
vance. Put another way, the a priori and the hybrid factors bolstered
the majority’s conclusion that the dual-sovereignty doctrine fell
within the range of permissibility and was far from demonstrably
erroneous.
IV. JUSTICE GORSUCH’S DISSENT: THE FACTORS AS ORIGINAL
CORRECTNESS PROXY TOOLS
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch condemned the dual-sovereignty
doctrine by arguing that the exception “to the bar against double
jeopardy finds no meaningful support in the text of the Constitution,
its original public meaning, structure, or history.”113 After dismiss-
ing the majority’s countervailing arguments, Justice Gorsuch opined
that “the government is left to suggest that we should retain the
separate sovereigns exception under the doctrine of stare decisis.”114
To be sure, Justice Gorsuch noted that the government’s stare
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2005.
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decisis defense was not meritless, conceding that “[s]tare decisis has
many virtues.”115 He argued, however, that “judges swear to protect
and defend the Constitution,” not erroneous precedent.116 Because
“the Constitution as originally adopted and understood did not allow
successive state and federal prosecutions for the same offense,”
Justice Gorsuch concluded that he need not blindly adhere to the
dual-sovereignty doctrine.117
Nothing stopped the Justice from ending his analysis there. If he
were so inclined, he simply could have adopted Justice Thomas’s
view that “demonstrably erroneous precedent” should be corrected
“regardless of whether other factors support overruling the prece-
dent.”118 Justice Gorsuch, nevertheless, went on to analyze several
of the stare decisis factors—considering them probative in his
inquiry into the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s original correctness.119
He began his analysis with the a priori “quality of [the] reason-
ing” factor.120 In doing so, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the
Court had previously relied on dicta from nineteenth-century
opinions to reaffirm the dual-sovereignty doctrine.121 He argued
that the Court “normally” does not “give precedential effect to such
stray commentary,”122 given that the Court often fails to consult the
“original meaning” and “the relevant historical sources before
offering its dictum.”123 The Court’s reliance on this dubious author-
ity over the years thus undermined the quality of the reasoning
behind the precedent. It follows that Justice Gorsuch’s use of this a
priori factor was as a proxy tool to evaluate the dual-sovereignty
doctrine’s original error.
For Justice Gorsuch, the hybrid margin of victory factor mattered
too. He used the factor as a proxy to reveal the precedent’s original
wrongheadedness rather than to highlight real-world effects stem-




118. Id. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 2006-09 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2006 (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018)).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2007.
21
Aimonetti: Second Guessing Double Jeopardy: The Stare Decisis Factors as Pro
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
56 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 61:035
affirming the dual-sovereignty doctrine “were decided by the
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic
underpinnings of those decisions.”124 Those dissenting opinions, in
short, highlighted the shaky ground upon which the precedent was
built.125 Likewise, he invoked the “traditional developments in the
law” hybrid factor as a proxy to undercut the dual-sovereignty
doctrine’s doctrinal underpinnings. According to Justice Gorsuch,
after incorporation, the “premise” that the Double Jeopardy Clause
only applied to the federal government “fell away.”126 For that
reason, then, the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s underlying rationale,
although questionable from the beginning, was certainly wrong
after incorporation.127
Justice Gorsuch also examined a posteriori factors to challenge
the dual-sovereignty doctrine. The first of the two he marshaled
was the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes” factor.128 In
his mind, the proliferation of federal criminal statutes meant that
today, virtually every American could be “indicted for some federal
crime.”129 Other things being equal, then, structural and doctrinal
change supported overturning the dual-sovereignty doctrine because
the world today is a different place.130 Justice Gorsuch also analyzed
the “reliance” factor.131 For him, the a posteriori reliance factor could
not justify continued adherence to the dual-sovereignty doctrine, as
prosecutors are “the only people who have relied on the separate
sovereigns exception.”132 He concluded that stare decisis should
present no obstacle because the “Court has long rejected the idea
that ‘law enforcement reliance interests outweig[h] the interest in
protecting individual constitutional rights so as to warrant fidelity
to an unjustifiable rule.’”133 Put another way, Justice Gorsuch used
the fact that only prosecutors rely on the doctrine to support his
124. Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-29 (1991)).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 2008.
127. See id.
128. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018)).
129. Id. (quoting William N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalization of America,




133. Id. at 2008-09 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009)).
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view that “[i]t is not for this Court to reassess” the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights “to make the prosecutor’s job easier.”134
In sum, Justice Gorsuch analyzed a priori, hybrid, and a posteri-
ori factors to call for the overruling of the dual-sovereignty doctrine.
More to the point, he used both the a priori and hybrid factors to
support his conclusion that the dual-sovereignty doctrine “was
wrong when it was invented, and it remains wrong today.”135 While
his analysis of the a posteriori factors clearly would not appeal to
Justice Thomas,136 his use of other factors as original correctness
proxy tools calls into question Justice Thomas’s dismissal of the re-
maining factors as wholly irrelevant. As Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
makes clear, some factors are valuable for their ability to probe a
decision’s rightness or wrongness as an original matter.
V. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENT AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE
A POSTERIORI FACTORS
Rather than adhere to the “misguided [dual-sovereignty] doc-
trine,” Justice Ginsburg would have held that “the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars ‘successive prosecutions [for the same offense] by parts
of the whole USA.”’137 She explicitly questioned the dual-sovereignty
doctrine’s “premise,”138 disputing that the federal and state govern-
ments “must be allowed to vindicate—a distinct interest in enforcing
[their] own criminal laws.”139 Rather, in her view, “when Federal
and State Governments prosecute in tandem, [it] is the same as it
is when either prosecutes twice.”140 Despite casting doubt upon the
correctness of the dual-sovereignty doctrine, Justice Ginsburg still
conceded that the “doctrine ... has been embraced repeatedly by the
Court.”141 Nevertheless, she “would not cling to” the “ill-advised
134. Id. at 2009.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
137. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1989 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Sanchez
Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2016)).
138. Id. at 1991.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1993.
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decisions”142 that reaffirmed the dual-sovereignty doctrine, as
‘“[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command.”’143
Given her view that the factors cut against the dual-sovereignty
doctrine, Justice Ginsburg treated stare decisis as no command at
all. Even still, like Justice Alito, Justice Ginsburg was conspicu-
ously selective about which factors to deploy. She first invoked the
a priori quality of the reasoning factor, calling attention to the
doctrine’s ill-founded basis by pointing out that “the Court relied on
dicta from 19th-century opinions” to adopt and reaffirm the dual-
sovereignty doctrine.144 In this respect, Justice Ginsburg argued
that because the Court relied on dicta, by default, “the Court gave
short shrift to contrary authority” that supported overruling the
doctrine.145 Thus, the a priori quality of the reasoning factor, in her
view, served as a proxy for the doctrine’s original error.
Justice Ginsburg next considered the hybrid doctrinal change
factor. In her assessment, the incorporation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the states left the dual-sovereignty doctrine a sort of “legal
last-man-standing for which we sometimes depart from stare
decisis.”146 Unlike Justice Gorsuch, Justice Ginsburg appeared to
use the hybrid factor less to explore the original correctness of the
doctrine, but more to highlight how the doctrine has applied in a
changing world. She noted that the doctrine originally “restrained
only federal, not state, action.”147 After incorporation, both the state
and the federal governments were restrained by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, yet criminal prosecution by both sovereignties has
only escalated for the same crime.148 For Justice Ginsburg, the
hybrid doctrinal change factor served to highlight real-world change
more so than original incorrectness. Under Justice Thomas’s ap-
proach, then, the hybrid factor used in this way would be irrelevant
to his ultimate inquiry.
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the a posteriori factor concerning
changed practical circumstances also called for overruling the dual-
142. Id. at 1990.
143. Id. at 1993 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
144. Id. at 1991.
145. Id. at 1991-92.
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sovereignty doctrine. As “federal criminal law ha[d] been extended
pervasively into areas once left to the States,”149 federal and state
prosecutors gained the ability to “join together to take a second bite
at the apple.”150 Making matters worse, the exponential growth of
federal criminal statutes resulted in the prosecution of “run-of-the-
mill felon-in-possession charges,” the likes of which Mr. Gamble
encountered.151 Thus, changed practical circumstances—in this case,
the proliferation of federal criminal law—“exacerbated ... problems
created by the separate-sovereigns doctrine.”152 The use of the a
posteriori factor to stress non-merit-based considerations, of course,
places it outside Justice Thomas’s stare decisis approach.
Equally important, Justice Ginsburg argued that casting aside
the dual-sovereignty doctrine would not implicate the a posteriori
reliance factor.153 She emphasized that the dual-sovereignty doctrine
affects only a small number of cases, noting that the Department of
Justice pursues “only ‘about a hundred’” dual prosecutions per
year.154 The only reliance interest substantially affected by overrul-
ing the doctrine, therefore, would be the “Federal and State Govern-
ments[’]” ability to continue with “ongoing prosecutions.”155 In other
words, private parties’ reliance interests would be unaffected if the
dual-sovereignty doctrine were overruled. As a general matter,
Justice Ginsburg stressed that, because of minimal reliance in-
terests, “eliminating the separate-sovereigns doctrine would spark
no large disruption in practice.”156
In her closing paragraph, Justice Ginsburg also invoked another
a posteriori factor to reinforce her conclusion that the dual-sover-
eignty doctrine should be overruled.157 Referencing the impact on in-
dividual liberty factor, she argued that continued adherence to the
doctrine diminished “individual rights shielded by the Double
149. Id. at 1994.




153. Id. at 1995.
154. Id. (citation omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1995-96 (invoking the individual liberty a posteriori factor).
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Jeopardy Clause,”158 perverting the Clause’s liberty-based rationale.
Justice Ginsburg’s exploration of the impact on liberty factor thus
centered on the dual-sovereignty doctrine’s effects in the real
world.159
In her final analysis, Justice Ginsburg would have laid “the
‘separate-sovereigns’ [exception] to rest,” given not only her con-
viction that its legal basis is incorrect, but also her view that it
produces deleterious results in the real world.160 Although Justice
Ginsburg could not garner a majority in support of her views, her
analysis is enlightening in the context of stare decisis. She reached
across the a priori/a posteriori divide, marshaling both types of
factors to support her criticism of the dual-sovereignty doctrine.161
Her approach in this regard mirrored that of her more conservative
colleague, Justice Gorsuch, who, though a textualist and originalist,
considered not only the precedent’s original correctness but also its
practical effects.162 On the one hand, that jurists with differing
philosophies argued in similar ways is a testament to the factors’
flexibility. But, on the other hand, the factors’ malleability bolsters
Justice Thomas’s critique—that the factors are indeed so broad that
they may be used to legitimate any outcome. Justice Thomas’s
criticisms in this respect may have force, but his preference to
discard the current stare decisis paradigm wholesale misses the
significant utility that at least some of the factors have in informing
whether a precedent is correct as an original matter.
CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas’s critique of his colleagues’ approach to stare
decisis—that the factors amount to prudential marbles placed on
the balancing scale—overlooks the hybrid and a priori factors’
relevance to precedent’s rightness or wrongness on the merits.163
158. Id.
159. Cf. id. (transitioning from analyzing the practical impact of the separate-sovereigns
doctrine to emphasizing the deleterious effects of the separate-sovereigns doctrine on
individual liberty).
160. Id. at 1993.
161. See id. at 1989-96.
162. See supra Part IV.
163. To be sure, Justice Thomas may prefer a different methodological lens—be it
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When the hybrid and a priori factors are used as proxy tools to
examine a precedent’s underlying rationale, they remain relevant
to the question of whether past precedent is within “the realm of
permissible interpretation.”164 It follows that as a practical matter,
the hybrid and a priori factors may help jurists, including Justice
Thomas, decide whether precedent falls within the range of
permissibility, or, in the alternative, whether precedent is “demon-
strably erroneous.”165 A “thoughtful and comprehensive” evaluation
of certain stare decisis factors may indicate not just a precedent’s
effects, but also whether “the decision is correct.”166
In addition, applying the a priori, hybrid, and a posteriori
categorization to the stare decisis factors may assist litigants in
framing their arguments to overrule precedent. The hybrid factors
in particular can be used to argue that the precedent is wrong
because of both the effects of the precedent’s application in the real
world and the precedent’s original wrongness. The dual function of
the hybrid factors thus allows litigants to appeal to jurists who
embrace divergent approaches to stare decisis.167
Given these considerations, Justice Thomas may be right to
criticize the multifactor approach to stare decisis, given the sub-
jectivity of an unweighted, multifactor analysis. But when the hy-
brid and a priori factors are used to explore the original correctness
of precedent, even Justice Thomas could rely on them to decide
textualism or originalism—to analyze the merits of precedent. That said, a Justice wedded
to a different jurisprudential philosophy can still theoretically arrive at a conclusion within
a range of a permissible interpretation that Justice Thomas is willing to accept. See McGinnis
& Rappaport, supra note 73, at 811 (“While the resolution selected by a prior decision may not
be the next judge’s preferred method, it still may not fairly be characterized as contrary to
reason.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as
Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 265 (2005) (“[J]udicial constructions of the
Constitution that are not inconsistent with original meaning may well be subject to the
doctrine of precedent.” (emphasis omitted)).
164. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 518 (2003).
167. Indeed, some originalists posit that the Constitution should be understood, under
some circumstances, “as authorizing that precedent be followed rather than the original
meaning, because it sometimes confers greater weight on other values, such as predictability,
clarity, and stability.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 73, at 829. Thus, the a posteriori
factors maintain relevance even to some originalists.
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whether precedent is “demonstrably erroneous.”168 In Gamble, then,
although Justice Thomas second-guessed the dual-sovereignty
doctrine, he should also think twice before dismissing the factors as
irrelevant to his stare decisis framework.
168. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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